The notions of judicial independence and impartiality were originally developed in light of national and international judges serving on permanent courts.' Two recent cases illustrate once more the inherent probl~matique of applying these notions to party-appointed adjudicators-that is, to party-appointed arbitrators and ad hoc judges in international courts. 2 These cases involved challenges to party-appointed arbitrators.' Since partyappointed adjudicators are often expected to be sympathetic to the positions of the party designating them, the very concept of partyappointed adjudicators may be anathematic to traditional notions of judicial impartiality. 4 This problem is further compounded by the tendency of parties to select arbitrators with whom they had Hersch Lauterpacht Chair in Public International Law, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University; Director in the Project on International Courts and Tribunals. The author thanks his research assistant, Mr. Eran Sthoeger, for his excellent assistance. previous professional contacts. This is because familiarity with the designated arbitrator's legal philosophy and trust in her ability to influence the views of the other members of the panel-two important attributes of designated arbitrators in the eyes of the appointing parties-are often founded upon these past contacts.
This article will argue that the institution of party-appointed adjudicator should be understood as a consensual deviation from the ordinary norms governing the operation of international adjudicatory mechanisms. This deviation represents a trade-off between two competing sets of values and interests; the first being the parties' interests in the increased control over the course of litigation facilitated by their ability to nominate adjudicators. Increased party control entails the sacrifice of some degree of judicial independence and impartiality of the appointed adjudicators in exchange for improved confidence of the parties in the adjudicative process. As a result, the parties have a greater inclination to resort to adjudication. It would, therefore, be a mistake to apply the tests of judicial independence and impartiality developed for permanent national or international judges, or even non-party-appointed arbitrators (sometimes referred to as "neutral arbitrators")' to party-appointed adjudicators. Moreover, such application might be counter-productive. Trying to "square the circle" and encompass party-appointed adjudicators within the compass of traditional notions of judicial independence and impartiality might dilute these legal standards and reduce the overall impact of ethical standards governing the work of the judiciary (and non-party-appointed arbitrators).
In Part I, I will briefly introduce the recent decision of the Brussels Court of Appeals in Eureko concerning the challenge to the continued service of Judge Schwebel on a UNCITRAL arbitral panel, as well as the recent ICSID tribunal decision in Suez concerning the challenge to the service of Prof. Kaufmann-Kohler on the arbitral panel. In Part II, I will offer some observations on the raison d'etre of the institution of party-appointed adjudicator (party-appointed arbitrators and ad hoc judges) and explain its inherent incompatibility with the ordinary rules and principles governing the independence and impartiality of the international judiciary. In doing so, I will use the Burgh House Principles-a code of judicial ethics developed by an International Law Association (ILA) Study Group-as a useful point of reference in this regard. Finally, I will offer, in Part III, some suggestions as to what could be expected from party-appointed adjudicators in terms of judicial ethics.
I. Two RECENT DISQUALIFICATION CASES

A. Eureko
On October 29, 2007, the Brussels Court of Appeals rendered its decision in an appeal against a lower court's decision.' The decision dismissed the Polish government's request to disqualify Judge Stephen Schwebel (the former President of the ICJ) from sitting on a UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal in a case brought against Poland by a Dutch company-Eureko BV.' The dispute revolved around some unilateral measures taken by Poland, measures which changed the operating terms of a recently privatized local insurance corporation acquired by Eureko. 8 On August 19, 2005, the UNCITRAL tribunal published its partial award on the matter, holding that Poland's acts were expropriatory in nature, violated its bilateral investment treaty (BIT) obligations to treat investments in a fair and equitable manner, and breached specific undertakings of the government vis-d-vis Eureko. 9 Shortly thereafter, on October 27, 2005, Poland instituted proceedings before a Belgian Court of First Instance (Belgium being the seat of the arbitration, and thus the procedural forum authorized to supervise the conduct of the arbitration proceedings). These proceedings were aimed at disqualifying Judge Schwebel from participating in the second stage of the proceedings in which the quantum of remedies was to be assessed." 0 Specifically, Poland alleged that in the summer of 2005, 6 . Eureko, supra note 3. 7. Id. 8. Id. 9. Id. 10. Id. around the time in which the partial award was issued, it learned that Judge Schwebel had joined the international litigation department of Sidley, Austin, Brown and Wood (SABW). There he would serve as co-counsel representing the law firm in an investment claim brought by Cargill, Inc. (a U.S. Corporation) against Poland on the basis of the U.S.-Polish BIT (a treaty whose content is generally similar to the Dutch-Polish BIT discussed in Eureko)." Although vehemently denied by Judge Schwebel, Poland argued that these facts raised certain doubt over the precise nature of the relations between Judge Schwebel and SABW.' 2 In addition, Poland argued before the Court of Appeals that Judge Schwebel's service as a co-counsel in the case of Vivendi v. Argentina (together with SABW) put him in a "vertical conflict" in the Eureko proceedings.' 3 This was because the decision in Eureko might serve as useful authority that Judge Schwebel could then use in the course of the Vivendi proceedings. 4 The Court of Appeals dismissed the Polish motion and affirmed the lower court's decision to reject the challenge to Judge Schwebel's membership in the UNCITRAL tribunal." Although the Court of Appeals accepted that Judge Schwebel may have had some professional associations with SABW, it held that he clearly maintained his independence from the firm and that there was no reason to believe he was influenced in the exercise of his arbitral functions by the firm's litigation interests.6 The fact that Judge Schwebel and SABW had worked in the past for the same clients did not create relations of dependence; nor should one attribute any significance to the proximity of the offices of Judge Schwebel and SABW." 7 As for the allegations concerning the "vertical 11. Id. In its brief, Poland cited a press release by SABW announcing their collaboration with Judge Schwebel in high profile international cases and a website mentioning the involvement of Judge Schwebel in the Cargill case; it also produced witness testimony to the effect that Judge Schwebel shares the same office space with SABW. Finally, Poland alluded to Schwebel's conduct during the proceedings, and alleged that it was unfavorable to Poland's litigation interests.
12. presented with a sufficient degree of promptness and that, in all events, it was lacking in substance: [D] oes the fact that an arbitrator or a judge has made a decision that a party in one case interprets as against its interests mean that such judge or arbitrator cannot be impartial to that party in another case? Further, does the fact that a judge or arbitrator had made a determination of law or a finding of fact in one case mean that such judge cannot decide the law and the facts impartially in another case? We believe that the answer to all [both] questions is no. A finding of an arbitrator's or a judge's lack of impartiality requires far stronger evidence than that such arbitrator participated in a unanimous decision with two other arbitrators in a case in which a party in that case is currently a party in a case now being heard by that arbitrator or judge. To hold otherwise would have serious negative consequences for any adjudicatory system."
In other words, the tribunal was not persuaded that the participation of an arbitrator in a past arbitral decision .unfavorable to the litigation interests of one of the parties to the subsequent case created an objective appearance of bias against that party. 26
II. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF PARTY-APPOINTED ARBITRATORS
The two aforementioned decisions are hardly exceptional and resemble other decisions issued in the course of disqualification proceedings. 27 Still, they do underline some of the unique problems 25. Id. 36. 26 . The tribunal also noted that the cases are different in their factual and legal bases-in particular Suez, unlike CAA, involved necessity-type arguments relating to the Argentinean financial crisis. Id. 37.
27. The most prominent ICSID case to date, where a similar issue had arisen is Amco Asia v. Indonesia, where a challenge was made to the service of a party-appointed arbitrator, on the grounds that in the past he consulted with the appointing party and worked in a law firm that used to share office space with the claimant's law firm. According to the two remaining (and unchallenged) arbitrators, although the same standards of independence and impartiality apply to all arbitrators, an arbitrator ought not to be -disqualified "for the only reason that some relationship existed between that person and a party, whatever the character-even professional-or the extent of said relations." Amco Asia Corp., supra note 17. For an example of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge an arbitral award on the ground that a party-appointed arbitrator was embroiled in a "vertical conflict" (direct involvement of the arbitrator in a company that filed a related claim against the same respondent party), see [Vol. 30:473 related to the institution of the party-appointed adjudicator. Specifically, these cases highlight the inherent tension between the principle of judicial independence and impartiality, and notions of personal trust and professional predisposition underlying the selection of party-appointed adjudicators. Although often hard to prove, it is possible that a specific party-appointed arbitrator (or ad hoc judge) was selected precisely because she argued in other past or pending cases in favor of specific legal theories. It is also possible that an arbitrator in one case was appointed in a subsequent case by reason of the factual and legal conclusions she reached in the first-in-time decision that may be conducive to the litigation interests of the designating party. Furthermore, the parties' personal acquaintances and past associations with the designated arbitrators can be instrumental in creating the necessary degree of trust in her capabilities. That trust may generate, in turn, the comfort level that the parties need in order to submit their disputes to international arbitration. 28 Moreover, in cases involving close-knit professional communities, it is almost impossible to completely avoid appointing prior acquaintances or associates unless the parties are willing to appoint arbitrators with no relevant experience or prior knowledge of the topics at hand. 29 reprinted in 2 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT (a "vertical conflict" between an arbitrator's duty to impartially decide the case before it and his role as counsel in another pending case involving similar issues should lead to disqualification). 59, 62 (1995) ("If, as elaborated below, one of the principal functions of a party-appointed arbitrator is to give confidence in the process to the parties and their counsel, some basis for that confidence needs to be established. Sometimes that confidence can be based on mutual acquaintances, without direct personal contact; some potential arbitrators become well-known through published writings, lectures, committee work, or public office. Others are not so well-known, and I understand that lawyers or clients or both want to have a firsthand look. I think, however, some restraint should be shown by both sides.").
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29. For a similar argument, see Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84 ("[Tlhe small size and population of an industry might require a relaxation of judicial scrutiny [of arbitrator impartiliaty]."); Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia, 480 F. Supp. at 358 ("The maritime community in New York is relatively small, and closely knit. There are not many experienced maritime arbitrators. Commercial relationships in the industry interweave and overlap; the leaders of the industry come in constant contact with each other; on occasion disputes, arbitration, and litigation result. It would be disruptive of the resolution of maritime disputes by arbitration in this City to disqualify an arbitrator simply because a party to an arbitration proclaims, in circumstances such as these, 'the appearance of bias."').
A. The Raison d'ttre of the Institution of Party-Appointed Adjudicator
In order to further analyze the two aforementioned decisions, one ought to spend more time considering the unique role of party-appointed adjudicators. If, as I believe is the case, their functions are significantly different than those of permanent judges or non-party-appointed adjudicators, then the application of international rules and principles of judicial independence and impartiality to them may differ as well. In other words, a need may arise to adapt to the principle of judicial independence and impartiality so as to meet the particular needs associated with the institution of the party-appointed adjudicator.
The limited scope of this article does not permit a comprehensive historical survey of the evolution of the partyappointed adjudicator within international dispute settlements. Hence, it is limited to a few rudimentary observations on the development of international arbitration.
Before the nineteenth century, inter-state arbitration tended to be political in nature." This meant that disputes were submitted to resolution before a neutral ruler or another senior functionary, who typically settled the dispute through issuing an unreasoned award. 31 Throughout the nineteenth century, international arbitration became more and more legalized, 32 yet this transformation was gradual in nature." Initially, arbitrations were typically conducted through a two-stage process.' In the first stage, party-appointed arbitrators or commissioners would aim to find a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute on the basis of legal and extra-legal considerations. 35 If they failed to reach agreement, an umpire would be summoned for the second stage of the proceedings and asked to decide the case. Later on, partly for reasons of procedural expediency and partly for reasons of judicial propriety, 37 single panels comprised of a mixture of party and non-party-appointed arbitrators were created." Party-appointed arbitrators originated as part agents, part adjudicators. 9 They essentially served as the "long arm" of the parties to which broad dispute resolution powers were delegated, and under this new configuration, the role of party-appointed arbitrators underwent a transformation to relatively independent dispute-settlers." 0 The institution of the ad hoc judge grew out of this early twentieth century configuration of international arbitration, 1 and the ad hoc judge serves as a constant reminder of the influence of international arbitration on the evolution of adjudication.
What is the modern role of party-appointed adjudicators then? In a way, they preserve some delegated functions on behalf of the appointing party. They no longer serve as "seconds" or "partisans once removed from the controversy" 2 authorized to formulate a settlement on behalf of the parties. Nor do they serve as party representatives who act for and on behalf of their appointing parties. 3 Nonetheless, they still serve the parties' interests in two important ways. First, they monitor the proper and fair conduct of the adjudicative process.' Second, they ensure that the appointing parties' positions and interests are properly understood and considered by the tribunal." On a more abstract level, they also help to maintain the confidence of the parties in the adjudicative process and preserve some, albeit modest, degree of control over the process. ' This, however, is not the complete picture. In reality, parties afforded the power to appoint an adjudicator do hope to impact the final outcome of the adjudicatory process through appointing a person sympathetic to them or their case. 7 To think otherwise would be absurd. If nothing else, classic "prisoner dilemma" dynamics, the fear that the other party would appoint a favorable adjudicator, would lead to such an outcome.'
Even when viewed from this perspective, judicial independence and impartiality may still have a certain strategic value. A party-appointed adjudicator may be more effective in terms of impacting the outcome of the adjudicatory process if she is perceived as independent and impartial. 9 This explains the increasing tendency of parties to designate distinguished jurists who do not share their nationality as party-appointed adjudicators." This trend undermines, however, the traditional role 49. Lowenfeld, supra note 28, at 60 (over-zealous party-appointed arbitrators lose credibility with the other members of the tribunal).
50. Note that, until 1936, the PCIJ Rules required states to nominate nationals for service as ad hoc judges (although this rule had not always been observed in the practice prior to the elimination of this requirement). Schwebel, supra note 43, at 896. Only in the of party-appointed arbitrators as the best-situated member of the tribunal to elucidate the appointing party's arguments and their factual and legal contexts.-5 But this surely provides a weak basis for promoting judicial independence and impartiality: the parties will respect those principles only if they appear to serve their particular litigation interests in a specific case. Even when the parties acknowledge the utility of perceived independence and impartiality, they are unlikely to select adjudicators whose dispositions towards the parties and issues are completely unpredictable. 52 Indeed, current statistical analysis of IC judgments shows that in some ninety percent of the cases ad hoc judges vote with the party that appointed them (at the same time, the other judges on the bench vote with their country of nationality "only" some seventy to eighty-five percent of the time)." 3 These figures confirm our intuition that party-appointed adjudicators are pre-disposed to vote in favor of their appointing party.
So the fundamental dilemma remains unresolved-certainly, judicial propriety and even utilitarian considerations would support subjecting party-appointed adjudicators to the same high ethical standards to which permanent judges and non-party- No. 4, at 75 (1928) ("Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the appointed arbitrators are subject;' however, such standards are likely to be systematically bypassed by sophisticated parties and adjudicators. 55 Moreover, such efforts might prove to be counterproductive. Attempts to bring party-appointed adjudicators within the purview of the traditional tests of judicial independence and impartiality could result in diluting these standards altogether. 56 As the Eureko and Suez cases may illustrate, such concerns are not unfounded. 57 In both cases, the court held that arbitrators, whose substantive positions on key aspects of the pending disputes could have been reasonably surmised from their past and concurrent involvement in comparable proceedings, should not be disqualified." While one can agree with the conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the ICSID tribunal in regard to partyappointed adjudicators, it would have been less appropriate to designate as non-party-appointed adjudicators individuals whose position on specific issues can be accurately predicted from their past professional records. Unless the institution of the partyappointed adjudicator is abolished or radically changed 59 -a feat that presently seems unrealistic and probably undesirable (at least from a perspective which respects party autonomy)'-ethical 54. See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp., supra note 17, at 6 ("[A]n absolute impartiality of the sole arbitrator or, as the case may be, of all the members of an arbitral tribunal, is required, and it is right to say that no distinction can and should be made, as to the standard of impartiality, between members of an arbitral tribunal, whatever the method of their appointment."); Tupman, supra note 5, at 45. 55. See, e.g., Mosk, supra note 48, e.g., id . at 263 (advocating flexibility in the application of ethical standards in arbitration, without distinguishing between party-appointed and non-party-appointed arbitrators).
57. 241-45 (2004) .
60. For a comparable analysis, see Davis v. Forshee, 34 Ala. 107, 109 (1859) ("Arbitration, in this State, is never compulsory. Parties voluntarily elect this mode of adjustment, and appoint their own arbitrators. We know no reason why persons related to suitors within the fourth degree, may not, if chosen, act as arbitrators, and make a binding award. Volenti non fit injuria.").
[Vol. 30:473 standards specially tailored for party-appointed adjudicators might need to be developed."
B. Application of the Burgh House Principles to Party-Appointed Adjudicators
The Burgh House Principles-a recent ILA-supported initiative to lay down some non-binding ethical principles that could govern the conduct of international judges-have explicitly refrained from tackling head-on the problems presented by the institution of the party-appointed adjudicator. The initiative stated that the principles elaborated there would apply to ad hoc judges and arbitrators only "as appropriate. ' Indeed, even a cursory look at the Burgh House Principles reveals their apparent incompatibility with a number of the features characterizing the status of a party-appointed adjudicator.
0 Security of tenure 63 -This entire notion, which is one of the hallmarks of judicial independence, is inapplicable to ad hoc judges and party-appointed arbitrators. As a result, party-appointed adjudicators are far more dependent on their appointing parties for future appointments than permanent judges.' * Extra-judicial activity" -The limited temporal duration of service of ad hoc judges or arbitrators renders it probable that such individuals would also be actively engaged, as practitioners or academics, in work related to the topics they may address as adjudicators. Hence, the potential for their finding themselves in what Argentina referred to in Eureko as "vertical conflicts" is considerable. The uneasiness 61. This was implicitly accepted by the ICSID tribunal in Amco Asia Corp., where it was held that although the same standards of independence and impartiality apply, in principle, to all arbitrators, the possibility of party-appointments presumes some acquaintance between the arbitrator and appointing party. Amco Asia Corp., supra note 17, at 7. (2005), pmbl., available at www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/ burgh-final_21204.pdf.
INT'L LAW ASS'N [ILA], BURGH HOUSE PRINCIPLES ON INDEPENDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY
63. Id. at princ. 3. 64. This predicament also affects the independence of non-party-appointed arbitrators, but to a. lesser degree: whereas all arbitrators are measured by the quality of their work, party-appointed arbitrators are also expected to satisfy, to some degree or other, the specific interests of the appointing party, if they seek to be re-appointed. 65 . BURGH HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra note 62, at princ. 8. about the dual role of party-appointed adjudicators has led the ICJ to introduce a Practice Direction that encourages the parties not to select judges ad hoc from among counsels who have appeared before the court in the previous three years, and not to appoint judges (including judges ad hoc) as counsels before the expiration of three years.' While this may help alleviate perceived impropriety in the ICJ, it does not fully resolve the larger problems of the "vertical conflicts" of party-appointed adjudicators. The Practice Directions place no limits on representation of the parties before any judicial forum other than the ICJ.
67
" Past links to a party'-Since the nomination and/or appointment of adjudicators (including permanent judges) is often based on previous acquaintances, it may be futile to insist on the complete absence of past links between the parties and their designated adjudicators. Even the Burgh House Principles suggest a mere cooling-off period of three years in which the judges do not work for the parties. 69 But given the unique degree of trust placed in party-appointed adjudicators and the greater flexibility of arbitral proceedings, it may be questionable as to whether this three-year period provides a realistic standard in many cases. * Post-service limitations 7 -Here too, the limited duration of service of ad hoc adjudicators renders these types of limitations largely unrealistic or irrelevant for most party-appointed adjudicators. Here, it already appears that many of the basic rules and principles that sustain judicial independence and impartiality are either unrealistic or irrelevant for party-appointed adjudicators. In the next and final part of the article, I propose to develop a The short aforementioned survey suggests that the ordinary rules and principles governing judicial independence and impartiality might be inadequate to govern the conduct of partyappointed adjudicators. Applying the same norms to partyappointed adjudicators may create a system of legal ethics divorced from reality, and have the potential to dilute the more robust rules and principles that could, and should, govern the conduct of non-party-appointed adjudicators.
A compromise formula should be sought. While judicial independence is an indispensable element of the judicial function, its application to party-appointed adjudicators necessitates some degree of flexibility. The personal trust underlying many appointments of party-appointed adjudicators presumes some form of past relations or acquaintances. Hence, I would support the "manifest lack of independence" standard proposed by the Amco Asia ICSID tribunal as the appropriate standard to govern the disqualification of party-appointed adjudicators.' Under this standard, neither past relations, nor peripheral or indirect ongoing relations between the party and the adjudicator appointed should, as a rule, lead to disqualification. 72 This is particularly so because the appointment to serve on an arbitration tribunal or court constitutes a strong form of relationship that eclipses older or less significant forms of relations (and creates in itself some degree of dependency relating to possible future appointments, which eclipses weaker forms of dependency). At the same time, strong and direct ongoing relations between the adjudicator and the appointing party (including the existence of ex parte communications between the two), should, as a rule, lead to disqualification unless the opposing party waives its objections to the continued service of the party-appointed adjudicator." The application of the principle of judicial impartiality to party-appointed adjudicators may prove to be an even more delicate matter. Since party-appointed adjudicators are often nominated because of their presumed dispositions" (which render them, at least, somewhat partial), the application of stringent standards of judicial impartiality to party-appointed adjudicators may be a hopeless task. The actual dynamics of the appointment process are such that they are likely to give rise to chronic partiality concerns. Unfortunately, the ability of external bodies to monitor such "internal" dispositions -unlike external manifestations of dependence-is limited. 75 In addition, the costsboth in terms of material costs and interference with party autonomy and level of comfort in the process-might be prohibitively high. 6 So, arguably, the development of looser standards of impartiality for party-appointed adjudicators (e.g., lack of serious bias and good faith) would be more appropriate here too.
Significantly, the idea that different rules of ethics should apply to party-appointed and non-party-appointed adjudicators has considerable support in domestic U.S. law and practice.' Courts and commentators in the United States have been willing to acknowledge that party-appointed arbitrators may be "sympathetic" to the case of the party that appointed them-a euphemism for a permissible degree of "partiality." ' Indeed, the 1977 ABA/AAA Code of Ethics explicitly stated that partyappointed arbitrators "may be predisposed toward the party who appointed them, but in all other respects are obligated to act in good faith and with integrity and fairness" ' 9 (1977) . Note that the same rule also relaxed the party-appointed arbitrators' disclosure obligations, limited the ability to disqualify them and tolerated most past relationships between the arbitrator and her appointing party. Some U.S. State arbitration codes also distinguish between partyappointed and non-party-appointed arbitrators. See, e.g., N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1)(ii) (2008) . For a discussion of the differences between State law and Federal law on this issue, see Tupman, supra note 5, 29-30. [Vol. 30:473 pass "independent judgment." ' Yet, it should be noted that the provisions on "non-neutral" arbitrators have been strongly criticized by influential members of the bar as "embarrassing," 1 and such provisions have been omitted from the more recent 2004 version of the Code.' The distinction between party-appointed and non-party-appointed arbitrators is also missing from the AAA and CPR International Arbitration Rules, 3 and from the UNCITRAL and ICC Rules of Arbitration. ' Ultimately, the policy decision that needs to be made is which standard to choose. High, utopian, ethical standards will set laudable ethical goals but may have little impact on the actual conduct of adjudicatory proceedings and may inevitably result in either diluted interpretations of the standards or ineffective implementation of those standards. A more nuanced approach, however, will acknowledge the functional distinctions between different types of adjudicators and set varying ethical standards for differently situated individuals.' Since party-appointed adjudicators have a unique role in adjudication processes, a certain relaxation of the requirements of judicial independence and judicial impartiality with respect to such adjudicators is justified. Such a move would not undercut judicial propriety; to the contrary, it would prevent the liberal standards applied in decisions such as Eureko and Suez, from being used in cases dealing with the independence and impartiality of non-partyappointed adjudicators. Since party-appointed adjudicators ultimately neutralize one another,' defending the integrity and legitimacy of the adjudicatory process by focusing on non-partyappointed members and applying the strictest ethical standards to those members, is arguably more crucial than striving in vain to raise the ethical standards governing the service of partyappointed adjudicators.
IV. CONCLUSION
To expect party-appointed adjudicators to comply with the same standards of non-party-appointed adjudicators, namely those of judicial independence and impartiality, is both unrealistic and counter-productive. Disputing parties may elect to create a special procedure which responds to higher ethical standards. In this situation, the parties may accept some limitations on their autonomy and freedom of selection of adjudicators.' But, in the absence of such conscious choice, it would be far more sensible to strive for more flexible standards (some degree of independence and impartiality) than to overreach and set the threshold too high. Such flexibility would not violate judicial ethics; it would simply acknowledge the different functions of different adjudicative processes while also respecting the choice of the parties to engage in such processes.
Given the voluntary nature of international dispute settlements, ethical standards that are flexible enough to accommodate the parties' interests in maintaining some control over the adjudicatory process is preferable to an ethical straitjacket that might alienate the parties from the process and limit, in effect, their choice of dispute settlement procedures. Thus, as noted by Catherine Rogers, the debate is not really about judicial ethics; it is about the different adjudicative functions between party-appointed and non-party-appointed adjudicators. 89 87. ROSENNE, supra note 1, at 1081.
88. For an analogous rule, see 1977 AAA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 79, at Canon VII ("the two party-appointed arbitrators should be considered non-neutrals unless both parties inform the arbitrators that all three arbitrators are to be neutral or unless the contract, the applicable arbitration rules, or any governing law requires that all three arbitrators be neutral").
89. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 113-17.
